Saturday, February 21, 2009

P.5 The Two Horns of Realism and Non-realism

Because I’m often obsessive and just can’t help myself, let me have one last go at this…

First, what am I talking about when I say representation?
This is simple; what I’m rejecting is the idea that the mind is a mirror, or a reflection of objective reality and that in some manner or another our words get us closer to that reflection. Furthermore I reject the idea that through science, metaphysics, logic (whathaveyou) we are brought closer to a commensurable dialogue through which to communicate and know things. Along with this realist view is also the idea that we can be in come manner or another certain of the notion we’re representing, certain that we’re closer to truth, so on and so forth, even though it’s generally agreed upon that such a certainty cannot be maintained outside of a circular argument.

The map analogy has been often appealed to in this conversation, however there’s a problem I see in that. First off, I don’t reject the sort of rhetorical language that likes to say this squiggly line and this box represents this and that particular thing as in these instances we’re not talking about philosophical matters, we’re merely navigating the world and behaving as humans behave. In a better way, we’re merely being metaphorical; we’re being intelligent tool users.

Here-in lies the problem - and I think it’s pretty simple:
A representational / correspondence theory of truth is being maintained, however, a pragmatic / utilitarian justification for that position is being used. Now, more then a mere contradiction, the justification raises the anti and/or trumps the held position as it reduces the position to the state of affairs of the justification.
You said the following on your blog:
“There is no contradiction in saying that to discard representation is incorrect, yet at the same time no map can be the 'correct' one.”

In other words your justification is that, whereas there are no correct maps, we know that some maps work better then others – which isn’t a justification of representation at all. Let me put this in a simpler way; a realist position is one that says quite clearly, idea X is better then idea Y because it better represents phenomenon Z. However that’s not your argument at all, your argument is; idea X is better then idea Y because it better suits our needs and interest with respect to phenomenon Z.

If this is your argument/justification (which seems clearly the case), then representation is (like I’ve said) merely rhetorical and/or simply a nice way of talking about things. Your contradiction is simply that you’re not arguing for the ontological reality of your position, but merely trying to justify talking in a certain way. Since this is all your doing, and I have no problem whatsoever with the tool like use of saying that formula X represents phenomenon Y, then it’s really unclear that your even arguing a realist position at all. In other words if I assert “GOD”, the realist position would argue for the grounds at which God is represented in reality – but you, relative to your justification, would look for in what way making that assertion “WORKS”. If you took the realist horn however, I would simply forfeit my response and ask that you prove your representational position, in which case you’d grasp the other horn and we’d never get anywhere. The bottom line is, my justification can merely be that it works to talk about God; furthermore that God, as I’ve said, is metaphorical. Now here you might be tempted to ask, “a metaphor for what” (grasping realism), but then I’d ask, “what are you representing in your position and how do you know?” Which would get us right back to, “IT WORKS”.

Bottom line – you maintain realism, however justify it pragmatically. So you’re suggesting, as William James did, “Truth is what works by way of belief.” Not, truth is a correspondence with reality. But more accurately you seem to being saying; “It’s True that truth is a correspondence to reality as it works by way of belief.” More importantly, your pragmatic justification rendors your position of representation arbitrary.

Can I say, “It’s true that I’m an atheist because God say’s I am.”

9 comments:

  1. First of all, you seem to be rejecting a simplistic positivist notion of representation that I don't share. I don't think the mind is like a mirror.

    But you go on to say that you don't think science or logic enables us to get closer to a commensurable dialogue through which to know or communicate things. But what we know from our lives is that logic and science are effective tools for scrutinising arguments and finding things out. Then we can talk to each other and get things done.

    If Rorty wants to catch a plane he consults a plane timetable. This is because he has good reasons for thinking that the symbols contained therein are likely to bear a relation to the plane departure times and destinations.

    It is useful to say that the numbers written in the timetable represent the departure times. You might think that is rhetorical, but one of the reasons it would be useful to talk that way is that the squiggles on the page do stand in a certain relation, all things being equal, to the plane departure times. if you doubt this then why don't you release a plane timetable with arbitrary symbols in it and see if it catches on.

    Yes of course there might be fog, or the plane might be late or hijacked. It isn't Truth we are talking about, just good reasons for thinking some things are likely to be the case.

    You keep coming back to the circular argument. I can't think of another way to explain why this does not help your case. So I'll just reiterate, it counts against a naive foundationalism which seeks a bullet proof validation that we can know what we know. We can't have it, and the sooner people let it go, the better in my view.

    I think your position on maps is looking less and less tenable. You don't mind the human talk about this squiggly line representing the river, because it isn't philosophy, it is just people using a map and trying to find the river. That's tool use alright. But if you want to deny to a map user's face that the way the tool works is to represent features of the terrain by symbols and squiggly lines, then I wish you luck. It doesn't pass the giggle test I'm afraid.

    We know some maps work better than others, but we also have good reasons to suppose we know why, and I'm afraid your account just is not plausible on this matter.

    The theory of truth I maintain is not a simple representational/correspondence one. Rather, it takes elements from minimalism, pragmatism, instrumentalism and realism.

    It utilises minimalism in that it turns away from the recursive inquiry along the lines of 'How do we know that we know that we know...', or 'Is it true that it is true that it is true....'. The issue is the issue. If we want to compile tables of the timing of high tide at a given beach, we won't waste time arguing about what constitutes 'truth', we will just get on with the matter at hand. The pragmatist in us means we use what works and the instrumentalist in us reminds us that, for example, our notion of an electron is a feature of our physical model, and this is a tool we use to manipulate and predict aspects of the world. We don't waste time thinking about what the electron-in-itself is. One day, a better model might come along and we might dispense with electrons.

    Finally, our realist aspect reminds us that some features of reality don't seem to be amenable to negotiation. If we try, we just keep bumping into it. The way we know our model is better is inside the issue, it gets better, more useful results. But we can also suppose that this is not a miracle and unless we adopt global scepticism, we account for it by appeal to a relation between the model, and the way the world impinges on us, over and over again.

    So let's turn to god...well maybe I'd better leave that until tomorrow.

    Just to summarise and clear up one misconception you seem to have about my position regarding maps: they are a product of human needs and interests, if you are interested in rainfall you will want a rainfall map, or if you have a geopolitical question then a different kind of map. It is meaningless to debate which is more correct than the other. But I bet you a hundred dollars that if I draw a rainfall map of the Midwest and I kind of make it up, I indulge my aesthetic whims, then people who want to get things done that pertain to rainfall won't find it useful. I have a reasonable idea, I think, of why that is the case. So, here's my challenge to you, can you say why you think it is the case?

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  2. But you go on to say that you don't think science or logic enables us to get closer to a commensurable dialogue through which to know or communicate things.

    I'm speaking relative to certainty here... But we can move past that...

    It utilises minimalism in that it turns away from the recursive inquiry along the lines of 'How do we know that we know that we know...', or 'Is it true that it is true that it is true....'. The issue is the issue. If we want to compile tables of the timing of high tide at a given beach, we won't waste time arguing about what constitutes 'truth', we will just get on with the matter at hand. The pragmatist in us means we use what works and the instrumentalist in us reminds us that, for example, our notion of an electron is a feature of our physical model, and this is a tool we use to manipulate and predict aspects of the world. We don't waste time thinking about what the electron-in-itself is. One day, a better model might come along and we might dispense with electrons.

    This is a rather fine statement....

    But I bet you a hundred dollars that if I draw a rainfall map of the Midwest and I kind of make it up, I indulge my aesthetic whims, then people who want to get things done that pertain to rainfall won't find it useful. I have a reasonable idea, I think, of why that is the case. So, here's my challenge to you, can you say why you think it is the case?

    Of course you want me to say, "because it doesn't represent what's going on". But I have no problem with that statement as a manner of speaking - we understand each other quite well.

    You stated:
    But if you want to deny to a map user's face that the way the tool works is to represent features of the terrain by symbols and squiggly lines, then I wish you luck.

    Again, this isn't a philosophical discourse and I would do no such denying. I think we'd both agree that this sort of argumentation (being utilized by a seasoned philosopher to prove realism) would be most certainly giggled at.

    So then, moving on to God - I think we've beat this horse to death don't you?

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  3. PS,
    And again, all of your justifications for your positions are pragmatic ones - which in effect reduces your realism to a nice tool like rhetoric

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  4. No, I don't think the on negotiable bumping bit is pragmatist, but if you think it is time to call it on this horse, fair enough.

    So that brings us to god-talk. Let me draw another analogy. Suppose Jones is a member of a Salsa club. They meet regularly and enact the dances, and they talk to each other about the technical aspects of Salsa and also the life enhancing aspects of dancing. In short, they engage in Salsa-talk.

    Salsa-talk has meaning and function within the Salsa community, and Smith might say to Jones that such talk is so much babble, but Jones knows the life lived and the validity of Salsa-talk within that language community.

    With me so far?

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  5. Sorry, that should have read " the non-negotiable bumping...

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  6. Hold a moment - so the proof of your realist standpoint is that certain aspects of reality are non-negotiable? And because things are non-negotiable we can safely assume that our continued discriptions of the world are better representations of it - or just better tools to predict and control, i.e. getting better results?

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  7. Let me see if I can add to that and close the deal here, but I’ll have to rewind just a bit.

    Once again, I’m completely fine with the notion that the world is out there, but, on the other hand, truth is not out there. To this I think we both agree. If I make the statement, “If you bang your head on the wall it will stop.” I think we’d both agree that not only is that a true statement, but that it’s also non-negotiable – not non-negotiable in the absolute sense, but non-negotiable in the every day sense that we both understand each other.

    We might say that the truth in that statement exists as the result of a certain causal relationship we have with the wall, however outside of that causal relationship, I think we’d both agree that walls are not something that, when heads are banged against them, they will not go through. As well, there are thousands of different ways we could talk about that experience, even ways not yet formulated, and it would be my position that those different ways of speaking are not ones that more closely represent the reality of the situation, or get us closer to it, but only different ways of talking to suit different needs and purposes.

    When I reject realism then, I’m rejecting the idea of an evolving explanation that better represents the world and phenomenon. Different explanations, again, merely serve different needs and purposes. This is why I reject the sort of reductionism that says, a belief in God is really just the result of certain brain states. One explanation is not a better representation of some underlying reality, but a different way of talking (within a different paradigm of thought) to serve different needs and different purposes.

    Having said that (and as a non-realist), I’m perfectly comfortable with the idea that someday the need to talk about God will be dissolved for the need to have different sorts of discourses – however, again, these different sorts of discourses won’t arise out of the discovery of a better means of representation, but out of the changing needs and purposes of humanity.

    Thus, my justification for a religious discourse (to a certain degree) rests in the idea that it serves the need not only of myself, but of a certain community of believers I’m part of. To prove wrong and/or circumvent the truth of that discourse would be to demonstrate that the needs this community is serving are unnecessary relative to that discourse.

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  8. So then,
    You can make an argument that God doesn’t exist, just as I can make the argument that the wall doesn’t exist, however the truth of those assertions will not lie in the accuracy of representation, or in the non-negotiable terms of some objective reality, but in the purposes of discussion and the contingencies that lie behind them.

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  9. That certain aspects of reality are non negotiable isn't so much the proof of my standpoint, it is my standpoint.

    We have good reasons to suppose that some of our tools are representative in character.

    I can agree also that the world is out there but the truth is not.

    I think we’d both agree that walls are not something that, when heads are banged against them, they will not go through.
    One too many negatives? Or perhaps I agree that if we keep banging for long enough, they will go through, then it really will stop.

    We might well agree here that different ways of talking about a situation to suit our differing needs don't get us closer to a definitive representation of the underlying reality, any more than the rainfall map is closer than the topological map. But I wonder whether this aspect obscures for you another aspect, that my made up rainfall map won't serve as well as the researched and checked one. We know why it won't, the answer lies in those non negotiable causal relations. You dismiss any admission you might make about this as perfectly safe, because you have somehow inoculated philosophical discourse from this herd of elephants in the room. I'm not convinced.

    You reject the same kind of reductionism that I do, and the same kind of naive correspondence theory of truth. But at a cost of having to totally ignore the other side of the story until it won't be ignored, then you resort to downgrading it to everyday non philosophical discourse. Our paradigms do have to compete, not only in the social sphere of our needs and purposes, which is difficult enough, but also in the harsh non negotiable causal sphere. And that recognition is all, as a realist, that I ask.

    I suspect that as long as we are recognisably human, then there will be talk that would be recognisable to us as god-talk. I don't think that it's primary function is to represent reality, although it shares some of the forms found in discourses that do attempt that.

    Finally to your justification for a religious discourse. I can no more argue with this than I can argue against the ethos of my local Salsa club.

    PS
    If you want to make that move that the truth of the claim that god exists consists in its purpose within the language community which comprises its context, fine. But you must realise that if any of your Christian interlocutors cotton on to what that means, then you'll be in trouble :-)

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