Of course “in front of me right now is a computer monitor”; which of course I’m eyeing to a greater degree as I type…
However, outside of a certain behavior which includes making marks and noises, this statement really doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. In the same way, outside of a system of communication which includes speaking, marking, making symbols, systems of arithmetic, logic, etc. a map makes no sense at all either.
As the example goes, the map is a representation of the terrain; it corresponds to certain objective/material aspects of it – dark lines with perpendicular hashes are railroads, blue squiggly lines are streams and rivers, while blue patches are lakes – green patches are parks and forested areas, with broad circles and numbers representing altitudes – then there’s those little blue boxes with the tent, those are camping areas, or perhaps a wayside rest, with little black lines paving they’re way adjacent to them, through the cities and past my house… This, it’s supposed to be believed, represents the land.
Direct intuition seems to suggest quite clearly that such is the case, to the point that no-one outright would have a problem accepting it – however I find it highly problematic. Certainly before a squiggly line can be conceived of as representing a river, it has to be understood the enormous amount of contingencies that lead to that particular symbol being coherent in the first place. Looking at it just by itself we say, “this line stands for the river.” Is it the representative character of that statement that allows me understand what you’re saying, or is it rather your behavior as a whole that allows me to understand it? In another way, to say that words and marks represent and correspond is to suggest (or so I take it as suggesting) that outside of human contingencies these words and marks still hold a certain truth in and of themselves – it’s the old, “the universe speaks a certain language” bit. Which is for me to suggest that languages are not elements of human behavior, but elements of the way things are in themselves – and this seems to lead somewhat dubiously to the thought that speaking (in the form of representing) is really a third person enterprise with my hands firmly grasping the controls of a mysterious chimera inside the skull of meat puppet.
As elements of the way things are in themselves it suggests to me that, outside of human needs and interests there are still “blue squiggly lines and green patches”, but then I’m confused because, where are those blue squiggly lines and green patches? In other words, maps (if I can loosely use “represent” without being attacked) are at best representations of human behavior, not land masses. They represent certain contingencies which are always relative to ourselves.
I can’t escape the idea that behind any realist worldview is the idea of some sort of absolute – which either exists in a certain sort of commensurate lingo, or an all powerful all knowing God. How can you be certain that you’ve represented reality? In what way is the manner of my speak incorrect? You see, the only way to validate a strict realist, representative circular worldview is [again] to appeal to a ghost in the machine (a third person perspective), which ultimately validates the claim. A view of language (on the other hand) which is more tool-like and behavioral, has no requirement for ultimate justification or circular reasoning as what I’m saying has no ultimate relation to things in themselves, but only relates (once again) to behavior.
One of the reasons why I bring up democracy over and over (to which I haven’t received a response on the matter), is if language represents the terrain, then what is the terrain of Democracy? Where do we see Democracy? Where do we bump into it and how is this bumping into any different from bumping into the so-called terrain? This is why I infer that the answer is naturally, that “Democracy is merely a creation of the human spirit.” But if that’s the case, what’s it representative of (what’s spirit, or whatever word one would insert here)? Is Democracy real? Is it a fairy? The realist perspective fails to account for such phenomenon’s – of which we could include religion, love, goodness, and countless other human institutions. However, looked at from a behavioral point of view, the line between the terrain and human institution is blurred to a point that it makes no sense to conceive of such distinctions; that anything and everything from rocks to God, to love, to physics, are nothing more then human conventions based on certain contingencies that arose in our effort to thrive, survive, be happy and procreate.
I’m thinking to myself that this sounds like a sort of reductionism of God and religion, however I must remind myself that at this point in the string of this talk on Realism vs Non-realism, I’ve merely been talking about God as it pertains to a behavioral perspective… I think after this post I’d like to move on and get back to some thoughts I’ve been having on Rorty and Buddhism – as Buddhism is my secret love, and this whole liberal ironist thing is really eatin’ a hole through me…..
P.S.
Psiomniac, I’m not really sure where to go… And I’m really bothered by the fact that maybe I’m severely misunderstanding your point of view – it could be because I’m too much of a novice, or that I’m being too forceful with my own thoughts, I’m not sure. Perhaps you could draft a post on your blog that elucidates your major points??? Cuz I can be a little slow and stuff.
In the same way, outside of a system of communication which includes speaking, marking, making symbols, systems of arithmetic, logic, etc. a map makes no sense at all either.
ReplyDeleteI agree with that. You can't have representation without a system of representation.
This, it’s supposed to be believed, represents the land.
This is what I think and also what some modern philosophers think in response to Rorty, that he refused to acknowledge the fact that one way to cope is to copy.
Direct intuition seems to suggest quite clearly that such is the case, to the point that no-one outright would have a problem accepting it – however I find it highly problematic.
Perhaps your problem is that you are trying to conceive of representation as in itself an absolute, as a state of affairs which can exist independently of a community of representers? Since we seem to agree that it can't, perhaps the problem is that we disagree about what follows from this.
I remember Michael Frayn being interviewed and he was asked if there would still be nine planets in the solar system if there were no sentient life anywhere. (This was before the demotion of Pluto.) To the astonishment of the questioner, he said 'no', and I agree with Frayn on that one. I suspect that this is the kind of mistaken but powerful intuition you seek to argue against, but it isn't one I hold. I hold a different one, which I think doesn't involve the universe speaking a language or any ghostly chimeras.
One of the reasons why I bring up democracy over and over (to which I haven’t received a response on the matter), is if language represents the terrain, then what is the terrain of Democracy?
I'm sorry, I thought I had responded to that. I'm at a loss to see where the problem is with this. If I had implied that all nouns refer directly to concrete entities, or that the only thing language does is represent aspects of the world, then I could understand you raising it. As I haven't, I don't. 'Democracy' is an abstract noun for an interrelated set of human institutions or practices. These are features of the world. So are dogs.
I hope you can respond to this before I post something on my blog. Perhaps if we keep trying, we will come to understand our disagreement.
Ok psiomniac,
ReplyDeleteI think I'm beginning to see. You seem to be holding a rhetorical view of representation and/or perhaps a relative or systemic view.
If the universe doesn't speak a certain language, and we dump the notion of “things in themselves”, then the way in which we come to know things in the general sense is a systemic process, i.e. there are no absolutes, but perhaps useful, less useful or more useful descriptions of this that or the other. I say that representation is in this case rhetorical because to a certain degree representation suggests epistemological certainty, that I can be [eventually] absolutely certain that we’ve reached a level of commensuration relative to the way we speak about the nature of things – that this particular language is fully representative of the world we live in.
Regarding Democracy you state – “'Democracy' is an abstract noun for an interrelated set of human institutions or practices. These are features of the world. So are dogs.” But you also make the distinction that dogs are “concrete entities”. The problem arises for me as to the nature of your realism when you agree that outside of our causal relationship with dogs, they have no real existence, which begs the question that your stance is really one that’s based on definitions relative to human needs and interests. It seems I could just as easily paste the statement that our conversations about dogs are based on “interrelated sets of human institutions and practices” and you should have no problem with this – but in fact I think you do. There’s seems to be an enormous contradiction in what’s being said here, a having one’s cake and eating it too sort of phenomenon.
I would say that Democracy was formed (that’s a horrible word to use here, so please don’t’ unpack it) due to pressures from the world, in the same way dogs were formed due to pressures from the world. In one way or another it became necessary to form a certain set of behaviors and a certain sort of dialogue around these things – not because they were real concrete things in themselves, but because they were useful tools to suit our needs. Perhaps we talked about branches because we constantly bump our heads on them when traveling through the woods, perhaps we talked about Democracy because we trip over each others wants in needs relative to each other. Doesn’t really matter which way we go…
It sure is nice to separate the world between subjects and objects, to part it in this way and that – but since the world speaks no language, then it isn’t in any way pre-parted. It is man who makes such differentiations, based not on concrete entities per se, but on needs and interests.
I would take from your statement that on a communal level, religion is based on interrelated sets of human institutions and practices…
We're dancing... ;)
ReplyDelete(I've realized after the fact that I'm speaking beyond here)
ReplyDeletePsiomniac,
let me add some further questions to this if I could, to clear the way. I’m curious to know in what way you distinguish between science, religion and politics? Sticking to Rorty, at least with an example, would you say that Newton offered us a description of reality that more accurately corresponded to it, or merely a description that allowed us to better cope (“Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” Pg. 269).
Which, for you, is a more accurate statement, that “Aristotle said mostly false things about motion”, or “Aristotle said mostly true things about what HE called motion, but we don’t believe there is any such thing.” Or we might want to say, “Here Aristotle goofed, even in his own terms.” Or, “here we have a statement which would be true if anything in Aristotelian physics were, but which, alas, refers to something which does not exist and thus is false.” (PMN, Pg. 274).
-----
Let me repeat myself here with some better words:
I completely agree with Rorty that the notion of knowledge as accurate representation lends itself naturally to the notion that certain sorts of representation, expressions, and certain processes are “basic”, “privileged” and “foundational”. The issue is, there seems to be no way of isolating those basic elements except on the basis of a prior knowledge of the whole fabric within which the elements occur – hence my inclusion of the chimera and man at the machine who knows all of these elements a priori. Although again, you don’t take this position I know. In any case, we cannot then substitute the notion of accurate representation element-by-element for that of successful accomplishment of a practice. Our choice of elements will be dictated (yes/no) by our understanding of the practice rather then the practice being legitimated by a rational reconstruction out of elements. So here you see the vicious circle that exists. In other words we cannot understand a thing “X” unless we know something about how the whole thing works, yet we cannot grasp how the whole things works until we have some understanding of it’s parts.
You’ve given me a good example with the map and terrain, however this example exists within a larger context that cannot speak to itself in such a way that lends certainty to the claim – and therefore it seems to be just a belief. The problem seems to be for me, that you’re merely making an assumption about representation, and not following it up with anything that would show this to be the case. It seems we have an argument happening that’s loosely based on reasonable doubt, that it SEEMS correct to believe this way – it’s intuitive.
Yes I'd agree that I hold what you would call a rhetorical view. So maybe that's progress!
ReplyDeleteCertainly I don't see my view of representation as requiring epistemological certainty, and I agree that there are no absolutes, but instead less useful or more useful descriptions of this that or the other.
I still don't see the problem with dogs or democracy though. I don't agree that dogs have 'no real existence' outside of our causal relationship with them. I'm sorry if I gave that impression. But I'm not sure it is necessarily useful to talk about their existence as things-in-themselves apart from our possible experiences and causal interaction with them since we have no access to that. Our concept 'dog' relates to our needs, interests and so on, because it is our concept, it isn't reality. But so what? How could it be otherwise?
Democracy has a different ontology to that of a dog. But both are real aspects of the world. Unless you want to insist that tripping over needs and interests has the same kind of causal description as tripping over a dog, (and if you do I suspect you'll leave even Rorty behind), then there is no contradiction, enormous or otherwise.
So it is true that:
our conversations about dogs are based on “interrelated sets of human institutions and practices”
...but it is also true that these institutions and practices have a two way causal relationship with the world. Dogs impinge on us in ways that do not depend on how we think about them, which is presumably why no democracy has yet given them the vote.
In one way or another it became necessary to form a certain set of behaviors and a certain sort of dialogue around these things – not because they were real concrete things in themselves, but because they were useful tools to suit our needs.
But what suits our needs depends on what kind of entity we are talking about and how it causally relates to us. You can focus on the human side of the interface if you like, we can see that our tools are human constructs. But there is no contradiction with my view here.
It sure is nice to separate the world between subjects and objects, to part it in this way and that – but since the world speaks no language, then it isn’t in any way pre-parted. It is man who makes such differentiations, based not on concrete entities per se, but on needs and interests.
But again I insist that our needs and interests are in part a response to our causal interactions with the world. We don't get to decide how the world does that, so there are parameters within which we must operate in order to get some things done.
I would take from your statement that on a communal level, religion is based on interrelated sets of human institutions and practices…
Yes, I think that is so.
Oops, crossed posts there.
ReplyDeleteOk I'll try to give some off the cuff answers:
I think science, religion and politics are areas of discourse that involve sets of human activities and institutions. They serve different purposes and have different sets of methodologies, though with some overlap.
On Newton, he offered a system which allowed us to cope better. A plausible account of why it allows us to cope better is what is at issue. I think it is because it tracks a target better, and the target is observable regularities in the phenomenal world.
On Aristotle, I'd say which is the most accurate statement depends on your metric of accuracy. We are steering dangerously close to Popper and Kuhn, but I'd have to say that without detailed research I honestly don't know the answer as to which statement is most accurate.
We can't have certainty. That is something you keep coming back to, that we cannot be certain that we are representing the world accurately. I agree. But we can make models of the world that work better than others. The model is not reality, and we cannot know what aspects of reality it represents badly or not at all, until we fall over something.
But if we take on board that we cannot have such an absolute guarantee, then we can get on with trying to develop better models.
So I don't see a vicious circularity. I can agree with the notion that observations are theory laden, that two theories can be incommensurate and so on. But we always get back to interacting with the world and what we want to get done.
The problem seems to be for me, that you’re merely making an assumption about representation, and not following it up with anything that would show this to be the case.
I see this as a bit like this. Suppose you get a fifty page message in a really complicated code. You work for ages at decoding it, but just get back gobbledegook. Then one day, you crack it! A fifty page message which is sensible and intelligible pops out. Perhaps it is wartime and it tells you where to send your fleet to intercept the enemy.
The point is, there is in theory another decoding of the message which would work. You can't be certain that you have found the right one. So do you send the fleet or not?
That the map represents the terrain is not something that can be known for certain. It is just the most plausible explanation. Another is that it doesn't represent the terrain in any way at all, but by a miracle, everybody who uses the map gets to the right place.
So let me try and break some of these things down – you said:
ReplyDelete“Perhaps your problem is that you are trying to conceive of representation as in itself an absolute, as a state of affairs which can exist independently of a community of representers? Since we seem to agree”
- So then, representation does not exist independently
You said (in effect):
Baring the existence of consciousness, the 9 planets, (now 8) do not exist.
-Things then, do not exist outside consciousness.
You said (of representation):
“Yes I'd agree that I hold what you would call a rhetorical view.”
-That your view is rhetorical and not literal suggests to me that the only reason you’re suggesting it, is not so much for it’s truth value, but that’s it’s a handy way of talking about what we humans do. You toss certainty to the curb and agree that there are only more useful and less useful ways of talking about things.
But then you say:
“I don't agree that dogs have 'no real existence' outside of our causal relationship with them.”
-I don’t see a difference between something being outside of our causal relationship and/or outside of our conscious relationship – so I see this statement as sort of contradictory. Perhaps you could clear this up…
You follow this up with:
“But I'm not sure it is necessarily useful to talk about their existence as things-in-themselves apart from our possible experiences and causal interaction with them since we have no access to that.”
-This seems to add a further contradiction in that, on the one hand your saying that dogs [things/objects] do have an existence outside of our causal relationship with them – which suggests a thing-in-itself notion – but on the other hand you say there’s no real reason to conceive of things as having such an existence. So which is it? If you agree that our concept of objects relates to our needs and interests, then what is the nature of they’re existence outside of that?
You say then:
“Dogs impinge on us in ways that do not depend on how we think about them”
-This seems to suggest what I had stated earlier; that you are in effect saying that Democracy is made, and objects are found – but you disagreed with that I believe. In other words you seem to be say that Democracy is what it is due to human creative forces related to the way we think and conceive of it, where dogs (as they are found) force us to think and conceive in vary specific ways. But (as you say) doesn’t the world we bump into force us (in a way) to conceive of political practice and religious practice in much the same way a single object does? The world, or whatever factors may or may not be involved, is simply more complex – the ideas are not simply imagined but arise out of a causal relationship with the world in much the same way as a dog.
To Newton you state:
“On Newton, he offered a system which allowed us to cope better. A plausible account of why it allows us to cope better is what is at issue. I think it is because it tracks a target better, and the target is observable regularities in the phenomenal world.”
-You seem to be helping yourself to two different positions here. On the one hand you say Newton gave us a system that better allows us to cope. So in effect you’d agree with the non-realist stance – but on the other hand you say that his system allows us to “better track a target”. So in this case you’re essentially buying into the statement about Aristotle that says, “Aristotle said mostly false things about motion.” Which is of course the strict realist position…
You said (on certainty):
“We can't have certainty. That is something you keep coming back to,”
- Yes, I keep coming back to this because your positions seems to flip-flop. If you’re not certain you’re representing anything, then why say you are? On the one hand you want to talk “useful”, yet on the other you want to talk “representation”. This is like a catholic priest wanting to have his God, yet kill babies…
PS,
it finally dawned on me how to use the BOLD and ITALICS....
I think we have made progress. We seem to agree that:
ReplyDelete1) Representation cannot exist without a representer, so it cannot be wholly independent of us.
2) We cannot be absolutely certain that we represent things accurately.
Now, turning to your other points:
Baring the existence of consciousness, the 9 planets, (now 8) do not exist.
-Things then, do not exist outside consciousness.
I think whatever it is that we conceptualise as matter and energy exists independently of us. But the number system doesn't because it depends at root on analogy. So there is a sense in which the nine things that we had classified as planets do have an independent existence, but without us there would be nobody to analogise and so no 'nine', and no classifiers, so no 'planets' in that sense, just things that beings like us might experience that way if we existed.
-Things then, do not exist outside consciousness.
So whether or not things exist outside consciousness is in part a question of to what extent 'thing' is a human classification, like 'planet'. After all, what we conceive of as objects from an everyday point of view can be looked at quite differently from the perspective of physics. But my fundamental point is that whatever reality consists in, it interacts causally with us in ways that are not just up to how we choose to speak about them or what our interests are.
That your view is rhetorical and not literal suggests to me that the only reason you’re suggesting it, is not so much for it’s truth value, but that’s it’s a handy way of talking about what we humans do. You toss certainty to the curb and agree that there are only more useful and less useful ways of talking about things.
Not quite, it is just that I agreed with your description of my stance on representation as far as it went, so I thought that if that is what it means to have a rhetorical view, fair enough.
But here I disagree with your characterisation, because I don't think that there are only human concerns involved, rather these concerns are in part a response to the world.
-I don’t see a difference between something being outside of our causal relationship and/or outside of our conscious relationship – so I see this statement as sort of contradictory. Perhaps you could clear this up…
Well perhaps you could clear up what 'real existence' means first?
Let me put it this way: I think the world would be there without us, but by definition, the world as we conceive of it wouldn't.
So which is it? If you agree that our concept of objects relates to our needs and interests, then what is the nature of they’re existence outside of that?
We can have good reasons to suppose that they have some kind of existence that is independent of us, even though by definition we cannot conceive of what the nature of that existence is. So again, i don't think there is a contradiction there.
The world, or whatever factors may or may not be involved, is simply more complex – the ideas are not simply imagined but arise out of a causal relationship with the world in much the same way as a dog.
I agree with you there, I think that democracy and dogs have this in common: we did not have a free hand in how to conceptualize them. But without us there would be no democracy, whereas if people died out there might still be what we would conceptualise as 'dogs'.
On Newton I'm a realist, but I accept that there is a human side to the interface with the world. So we do cope and make better models. I reject the dichotomy of the non realist though, I think sometimes we cope better because we represent better.
I'm still doubtful about which if any statement about Aristotle is the most accurate. It depends what aspect you are trying to capture.
Yes, I keep coming back to this because your positions seems to flip-flop. If you’re not certain you’re representing anything, then why say you are?
Because I have good reasons for supposing that I am. That doesn't mean I have to be certain or that my representations have to be perfect or that they would exist independently of sentient beings. There is no contradiction and no flip-flop.
Well done on the bold though!
Real quick Psi;
ReplyDeleteonce again you keep appealing to the “found” vs the “made”, “reality” vs. “appearance”, “absolute” vs. “relative” distinction.
You say:
” …But without us there would be no democracy, whereas if people died out there might still be what we would conceptualise as 'dogs'.”
Although you throw in “might” and “conceptualize” which is a bit shady… You appear to be simply doing the same thing you accused me of doing – which in my case is blurring reality and using lingo like “language game” to justify my “God talk”.
You continually appeal to things like “use” and “better to cope” (which are pragmatist’s tools) but then you fall back on the old dogmatic realist distinctions of things, I don’t get it. You say we can have good reason to believe things have an independent existence, but what reason is that?
To say that the world would be there without us, but not in a manner in which we would conceive it, seems like you’re just being whimsical. I may as well say (as a realist) I don’t know if there’s a God, but there’s good reason to believe that there is. Why is that any less reasonable to assume?
once again you keep appealing to the “found” vs the “made”, “reality” vs. “appearance”, “absolute” vs. “relative” distinction.
ReplyDeleteI don't think you have shown that the distinctions I made, in the way I made them, were illegitimate.
Although you throw in “might” and “conceptualize” which is a bit shady…
No, it isn't shady. The 'might' just refers to the assumption that they didn't die out as well, and the 'conceptualise' simply recognises that our concept is not the dog. The concept would cease to exist if we died out.
You appear to be simply doing the same thing you accused me of doing – which in my case is blurring reality and using lingo like “language game” to justify my “God talk”.
I don't think so.
You continually appeal to things like “use” and “better to cope” (which are pragmatist’s tools) but then you fall back on the old dogmatic realist distinctions of things, I don’t get it.
I'm a realist to the extent that I think there is a reality that is independent of us, with which we interact. Does that mean I can't use pragmatist's tools? Not at all, because when they talk about the human interface side of things, they talk a lot of sense.
I'm not falling back on old dogmas, I'm just advancing a sensible position.
You say we can have good reason to believe things have an independent existence, but what reason is that?
Oh, so you are a solipsist? And you still type? Odd....
To say that the world would be there without us, but not in a manner in which we would conceive it, seems like you’re just being whimsical.
Not just whimsical, no.
I may as well say (as a realist) I don’t know if there’s a God, but there’s good reason to believe that there is. Why is that any less reasonable to assume?
Well, I don't think that is unreasonable in itself. There are very intelligent and insightful people out there who think that although they cannot be certain, there are good reasons to think that there is a god.
I guess that settles it then - there are pretty good reasons to believe in God...
ReplyDeleteOf course I'm just trying to push buttons here Psi. (with my previous post.
Feel free, push away. I hope I'll learn something and that we'll make progress, though by the nature of the subject matter, it's a long shot.
ReplyDeleteYes, I think there are good reasons to believe in god. I'm glad we have settled that one :-)
I'm not particularly concerned about pushing the "God talk" issue at this point.
ReplyDeleteI'm really just enjoying the opposition, and the chance through it to learn more about my own position.
Afterall, if it wasn't for your shitty position, I wouldn't have one. ;) I have some more thinking to do here....
In the meantime, since you're a guitar player, I work with this guy, he's pretty good (gotta give him some press)
Vaseline Machine Gun
Yeah he is good, in a totally different tradition of guitar playing to mine and that is always good to hear.
ReplyDeleteI hope your thinking goes well, and that I can supply a suitably enhanced shitty position to oppose what you come up with :-)
On a side note Psi:
ReplyDeleteIn my sidebar is a new link to "Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope", I'd be interested in your perspective on some of what's happening there if you have the time. Particularly the post "Atheistic Mystic".
I had a look at that debate and it was interesting. One thing that occurred to me was a parallel with the realist vs non-realist debate, in that each side seemed to spend time arguing against the other extreme end of the continuum, but actually there is a lot of room for agreement in the middle.
ReplyDeleteI practiced meditation for quite a while and I see no problem with the idea of people having experiences of being at one with everything and having a profound sense of inner peace.
Psi,
ReplyDeleteagreed, I'm seeing that as well...
I tried my hand at meditation as well - but simply found it to be a waste of time. Not that there wasn't an experience to be had, but it was usually the case that we needed milk and the garage was a mess.