Ok, so where was I...
From P.2 (HERE), Psiomniac's comment. My statments are in Green, Psiomniac in Blue, my response in Black
"It's my belief that in this instance the theist needs to offer up a reason why one should believe such a thing in the absence of proof."
"It is my assessment so far that the reasons we have for thinking we interact in dependable ways with a mind-independent reality, are an order of magnitude stronger than any reasons you have offered so far for belief in a specific god."
Since it’s clear that I’m not talking about interacting with a God who’s existence is mind-independent, and since (as of yet) no noncircular reason has been given as to why we should accept that mind-independent entities exist, then I’m not all together certain what burden I’m sacked with in this instance? If we both agree that such an argument doesn’t exist, than no real reason beyond my pragmatic (non-realist) account need be offered for my appeal to God.
"I think we’d both agree following your first paragraph that it would merely be an assumption."
"I wouldn't agree with 'merely'. Rather, I'd say that any functional world view must have a set of foundational assumptions. What differs is what they are and the basis upon which they are held."
Sure, Psiomniac, however I can make the same foundational assumption under my worldview and assert, “God exists”, but as it stands it’s no more or less provable from the realist perspective then your representationalism. What are your foundational assumptions I wonder?
"If one cannot show the truth of represenation, then why should I beleive it?"
"For the same reason that you should believe that you have a head, namely because it is sensible to do so."
Believing that one has a head has nothing necessarily to do with adhering to representationalism or correspondence theory – in other words, I can assert that belief (make the statement) without the philosophical point of view. Or to put it in yet another way, It’s sensible to have the statement in a language game “I have a head”, for reasons outside of philosophy; it directs our attention, speaks to our behavior, makes sense in a given language game, but doesn’t say anything about mind-independent entities per se. Since we don’t sprinkle in theories of truth within our everyday conversations, it’s clear that sensible in this case refers only to philosophical discourse – nothing more.
The way I talk about God, on the other hand, is not so much philosophical as it is just part of the way I (and the community of believers I’m part of) talk. It’s not about philosophy, it’s not about foundational theories of truth, its about understanding one another through a particular sort of dialogue – which is to say nothing at this point about a personal sense of mysticism.
Since it’s clear that I’m not talking about interacting with a God who’s existence is mind-independent,
ReplyDeleteThis is the nub of the problem. It seems to me that in previous posts you have accepted that the world has a causal effect on us. You have used our inability to have direct access to how the world is, to conclude that we can't talk about it. But all that means is we can't talk about the world as it would be, independent of our way of observing it. It doesn't follow that we can't talk about the world as we experience it.
Supposing Richard Rorty wanted to travel on the London Underground and he wanted to get from Notting Hill gate to Wimbledon. He has a choice of two maps to help him to do that. The maps are the result of two distinct language games. The first is the standard topological map of the London Underground. The other originates from the proceedings of the non realist Dada map makers meeting. The latter has, as they see it, aesthetic reasons for placing stations and drawing tube lines as they do. Ironic juxtaposition is at a premium.
Now, I'd bet on the former map being the one most likely to help Richard reach his destination. He'd do well to travel one stop westbound on the Central Line and then proceed south on the District Line. If you google the map, you'll see that this is the case.
What your account is inadequate for is to steer us to the right bet. We have two incommensurate language communities. But we both know which produces the map we need for each purpose, navigating through the world on the one hand, and an artistic exploration on the other.
So which way do you want to play it? Is your coffee table in any way mind independent or not? Once you can answer that, we might usefully talk about god.
and since (as of yet) no noncircular reason has been given as to why we should accept that mind-independent entities exist, then I’m not all together certain what burden I’m sacked with in this instance?
I think you have misunderstood here. There is no non-circular deductive argument for mind independent reality. But there are very good reasons for assuming such.
Sure, Psiomniac, however I can make the same foundational assumption under my worldview and assert, “God exists”,
Of course you can, if your taste is for more assumptions than absolutely minimally necessary and you are fine with not revising this assumption in the light of available evidence. That's up to you.
What are your foundational assumptions I wonder?
I had an argument with The Barefoot Bum about that. I think that my foundational assumptions are that certain aspects of the observable world will not be negotiated with, so it is best to find out any regularities in that, to the best approximation one can, if one wants to find out about the world.
Believing that one has a head has nothing necessarily to do with adhering to representationalism or correspondence theory – in other words, I can assert that belief (make the statement) without the philosophical point of view.
So what?
It’s sensible to have the statement in a language game “I have a head”, for reasons outside of philosophy;
I think this Wittgensteinian notion of a 'language game' has become a bit shiny for you. It allows you to protect your god-talk by rendering talking bout your head as just a social convention. The cost is too high. Not even Christians buy that, they want to actually be saved from death, not just engage in metaphorical or poetic wibble about it.
Since we don’t sprinkle in theories of truth within our everyday conversations, it’s clear that sensible in this case refers only to philosophical discourse – nothing more.
Or perhaps it is sensible because of those causal relations. You know, the ones that mean you will bump your head if you don't duck through a low doorway. You could form a group, a language community which felt it sensible to deny height as a concept, but then wonder about the propensity of lumps on members' heads.
The way I talk about God, on the other hand, is not so much philosophical as it is just part of the way I (and the community of believers I’m part of) talk.
I can buy that. If it works for you, then great. I don't understand how your stance passes the giggle test, but that's just me. However, as I implied above, I reckon that most of your community don't sprinkle their meta stories into their daily narratives either, so if you ask them, you might find that they just think god is real. Your account is unlikely to suffice for them either.
Of course, the topological map is not the territory. It isn't the Truth with a capital 'T'. It is geographically inaccurate. Nobody looking at it could reconstruct reality. But it gets you from A to B. I put it to you that there is a reason for that which your account has difficulty with.
Oops!
ReplyDeleteI hope Richard Rorty is a better map reader than I am (despite being dead) as I mean Queensway to Wimbledon. Though even then, it might be easier for him to walk the first leg of the journey if he has local knowledge.
Perhaps a better example would be Marble Arch to Wimbledon.
Sorry for the error.
You said:
ReplyDelete"Is your coffee table in any way mind independent or not?"
No.
I'll get back to this later today - but for now I'd like to have that question answered.
Psiomniac, (regarding your example)
ReplyDeleteYou’re merely falling back on the concrete idea that language represents the terrain, along with other symbols such as used on a map, so on. I think we’ve beatin this hourse, yes/no? I choose not to talk this way, and further more whatever philosophical position one takes on the matter it doesn’t necessarily impact our day to day communication, or our ability to read and make maps.
This is why I brought up Democracy and dogs, as both are certainly things I’d say we bump into in the world. I had stated: “We can say that our descriptions of a dog are relative to our own personal needs and interests, but it makes just as much sense to say that about democracy. Had there been no need to talk about Dogs, they would share just much non-existence as Democracy if we had chosen not to talk about it.” Now I imagine that here you’d like to make the distinction that dogs are physical objective things that exist independent of our minds (are things in and of themselves) existing in the world, where on the other hand Democracy is a mere creation of the human spirit and will. But I’d just assume do away with this distinction entirely. If language is a tool and beliefs are habits of actions, then I’m not placing my “God talk” within the typical framework of found things and made things, objective things and subjective things (per se), I’m merely talking about the habits and behavior of a given community.
That other Christians may not share my philosophical point of view is irrelevant to the fact that speaking about Christianity and it’s principles we understand each other. Realist and non-realist politicians don’t bicker over philosophical stances, they bicker “what’s best” in the matter of further justice, freedom and equality. I don’t see the conversation of the Christian (within a community) as being all that much different. Our personal beliefs, feeling of spirituality and mysticism on the other hand, are a different matter. So a Christian might proclaim that I’m taking such and such a stance as a matter of God’s will, but that piece of rhetoric (I tend to think) is backed by certain principles as in “all loving” and “all good”. However, we no more know whether or not we’ve satisfied this criteria then when we think we’ve satisfied the will of a Democracy by passing certain laws regarding equality.
More to come on this….
I'll get back to this later today - but for now I'd like to have that question answered.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what you mean here. There are lots of mind dependent aspects of coffee tables. Our causal interactions with aspects of mind independent reality are important factors in why it is useful for us to have the notion of an object like a coffee table.
You’re merely falling back on the concrete idea that language represents the terrain,
ReplyDeleteYou say 'merely' but although you might think this horse won't run, you still probably agree that Rorty would be better to opt for the standard topological map? Yes/no?
I choose not to talk this way,
That's your choice. But I think it has consequences about which our opinions differ markedly.
and further more whatever philosophical position one takes on the matter it doesn’t necessarily impact our day to day communication, or our ability to read and make maps.
That might be because reality doesn't care if we deny the possibility of representation or not. If we make good maps they work. Some of the elements that make maps good pertain to human concerns, language communties of map makers and map users and so on.
But you don't want to talk about the element that is at issue. That the map must stand in a relation to the terrain in order to be of use.
Now I imagine that here you’d like to make the distinction that dogs are physical objective things that exist independent of our minds (are things in and of themselves) existing in the world, where on the other hand Democracy is a mere creation of the human spirit and will.
I don't think I would have made that distinction but then:
But I’d just assume do away with this distinction entirely.
Not so fast. The problem is that this leaves you without a viable meta-story. You cannot plausibly account for your accounts. Which brings me to why I mention other Christians, because I think the philosophical difference between you and them is relevant. They want eternal life and they speak of a relationship with a living god. You might say the same thing and you might say therefore that as a language community, you understand each other.
I reply that if I say I like rock and you say you like rock, we might say we agree. But in what sense have we agreed if I mean rock music and you mean Rock Hudson?
So I suspect that you are seeking to protect your god-talk from rational enquiry, precisely because you are good at rational enquiry and realise the consequences if you don't. You've done it in a way that has a respectable philosophical pedigree, including Rorty's work. I take a different view on this, as do many philosphers.
Psi, you said, "you still probably agree that Rorty would be better to opt for the standard topological map? Yes/no?"
ReplyDeleteThat's entirely the problem--maps are fine for sea-faring and gettin' to Grandma's house. The problem is that realist philosophers have used this clear sense of map-making on analogy with how our language functions with reality. This is what realists haven't gotten to pan out (constantly harassed by the skeptic as they are) and it is this analogy, and only the analogy of cartography with philosophy, that pragmatists like Rorty object to.
Another thing pragmatists get rid of are "meta-stories." Rorty agrees with Lyotard on the rejection, but it has never been clear why, once we get rid of the notion of meta-stories, a story-to-end-all-stories, an ultimate context for everything, why we should think that we've gotten rid of stories entirely, of any kind of context for intelligibility. Lyotard and some other unfortunate post-structuralists/modernists/whatever have seemed to talk this way, but Rorty never has. If you have a text A, you always have a context B that can be elaborated, and during the elaboration of context B, it becomes a text, which itself has a context. This flip-flopping can go on indefinitely, and it made Aristotle fear an infinite regress, but in practice it is difficult to imagine how the fact that inferential reasoning is ultimately circular (like if you kept going at it for days) is going to put a damper on our sense of being rational.
Matt,
ReplyDeleteI just noticed that you stopped by my blog, thanks for commenting.
and it is this analogy, and only the analogy of cartography with philosophy, that pragmatists like Rorty object to.
I think we have to distinguish between your reading of Rorty and Andrew's. I have not read Rorty directly, only encountered his arguments in other books by philosophers. So I'm not offering a direct criticism of Rorty here, what I'm criticising is the following position which I'll summarise as my interpretation of Andrew's stance:
1. Language is like a set of tools. Tool users interact with the world and they use tools to do this, but a hammer, say, does not 'represent' the world. The notion that language represents the world is an illusion.
2. A piece of language can only represent another piece of language. Attempting to represent the world is futile since the world doesn't speak. This fits with the separation of the 'space of causes' and the 'space of reasons' introduced by Sellars.
3. Beliefs are habits of action. The task is not to adopt a more or less correct representation of the world, but to participate within the language community which is engaged in an area of discourse:
"..we understand knowledge best when we understand the social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representations. Instead of seeking 'vertical' relationships between language, or ourselves as language users, and the world, we must concentrate on 'horizontal' or inferential processes, whereby we advance and accept reasons from each other. Justification becomes a 'social phenomenon' rather than as a transaction between a 'knowing subject' and 'reality'." -- Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.9.
If you have a text A, you always have a context B that can be elaborated, and during the elaboration of context B, it becomes a text, which itself has a context.
'Il n'y a pas de hors-texte' :-)
This flip-flopping can go on indefinitely, and it made Aristotle fear an infinite regress, but in practice it is difficult to imagine how the fact that inferential reasoning is ultimately circular (like if you kept going at it for days) is going to put a damper on our sense of being rational.
I agree.