A quick thought before moving on:
Quoting Rorty again, "Contingency Irony and Solidarity" Pg. 5:
We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human Languages are human creations.
Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world ii our there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own - unaided by the describing activities of human beings - cannot.
The suggestion that truth, as well as the world, is out there is a legacy of an age in which the world was seen as the creation of a being who had a langu4ge of his own. If we cease to attempt to make sense of the idea of such a nonhuman language, we shall not be tempted to confuse the platitude that the world may cause us to be justified in believing a sentence true with the claim that the world splits itself up, on its own initiative, into sentence-shaped chunks called "facts." But if one clings to the notion of self-subsistent facts, it is easy to start capitalizing the word "truth" and treating it as something identical either with God or with the world as God's project. Then one will say, for example, that Truth is great, and will prevail.
I’m starting to get the feeling that this is all Pragmatism really needed to do in order to satisfy its urges – just replace truth. Notice that statements like, “That car over there is silver.” whether you have a proclivity for truth being in the world, or truth being just a product of language, our propositions stay the same. For example the pragmatist doesn’t say, “wait, we shouldn’t say it like that, because that suggests that that’s actually true of the world.” But one doesn’t.
So why then does Pragmatism dump the idea of representation and the appearance/reality distinction? A representative statement for a Platonist (one who sees truth as existing in the world) is a truth about the world itself. However, representative statements about the world for a Pragmatist is a truth that exists only in language – following above. The only distinction that needs to be made between the two sorts of representation (if we keep it on both sides) is between the idea that one discovers truth (for the Platonist) and the idea that we create truth (for the Pragmatist). In another way, from a Pragmatist point of view the shift between different representative characters (i.e. the idea that a given metaphor represents a certain fundamental idea) isn’t to say that we’re saying something fundamental about the world in itself, but a suggestion to shift between certain ways of thinking about concepts because a different way has more “cash value” and/or allows us to obtain more predictive power - on the one hand anyway.
In this way it’s fair enough to say (for example) that people have fundamental affective states, and that things we say and do are reflections of those affective states. To make the argument that this sounds like Platonism would beg the question as to why one would not consider the belief that, “That car over there is red.” is also Platonism because both can rightly infer that one believes that truth to be true of the world in itself. All we need though, is the statement above from Rorty to make the proper distinction (or simply the idea that Truth transcends language, but I’ll get back to that later). In this way our talk about these affective states gains it’s cash value not in the truth it speaks about the world but in the cash value we gain from the predictive insights we may or may not gain from having that sort of dialogue.
In summary:
All we’re really saying is that it helps to think of people as having affective states (and whether they do or whether they don’t is not something one can prove), and it helps to speak and behave as though they do, even if it means implying that certain metaphors are representations of those states (refer back to my post “Hierarchies of Thought”). To say that that’s true (again, from a Pragmatic perspective) is not to actually say that that’s True of people.
Of course this all raises other interesting points in my mind that I’ll tare apart in a post to proceed.
Showing posts with label Truth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Truth. Show all posts
Thursday, March 04, 2010
Sunday, February 08, 2009
P.3 The Two Horns of Realism and Non-realism
Ok, so where was I...
From P.2 (HERE), Psiomniac's comment. My statments are in Green, Psiomniac in Blue, my response in Black
"It's my belief that in this instance the theist needs to offer up a reason why one should believe such a thing in the absence of proof."
"It is my assessment so far that the reasons we have for thinking we interact in dependable ways with a mind-independent reality, are an order of magnitude stronger than any reasons you have offered so far for belief in a specific god."
Since it’s clear that I’m not talking about interacting with a God who’s existence is mind-independent, and since (as of yet) no noncircular reason has been given as to why we should accept that mind-independent entities exist, then I’m not all together certain what burden I’m sacked with in this instance? If we both agree that such an argument doesn’t exist, than no real reason beyond my pragmatic (non-realist) account need be offered for my appeal to God.
"I think we’d both agree following your first paragraph that it would merely be an assumption."
"I wouldn't agree with 'merely'. Rather, I'd say that any functional world view must have a set of foundational assumptions. What differs is what they are and the basis upon which they are held."
Sure, Psiomniac, however I can make the same foundational assumption under my worldview and assert, “God exists”, but as it stands it’s no more or less provable from the realist perspective then your representationalism. What are your foundational assumptions I wonder?
"If one cannot show the truth of represenation, then why should I beleive it?"
"For the same reason that you should believe that you have a head, namely because it is sensible to do so."
Believing that one has a head has nothing necessarily to do with adhering to representationalism or correspondence theory – in other words, I can assert that belief (make the statement) without the philosophical point of view. Or to put it in yet another way, It’s sensible to have the statement in a language game “I have a head”, for reasons outside of philosophy; it directs our attention, speaks to our behavior, makes sense in a given language game, but doesn’t say anything about mind-independent entities per se. Since we don’t sprinkle in theories of truth within our everyday conversations, it’s clear that sensible in this case refers only to philosophical discourse – nothing more.
The way I talk about God, on the other hand, is not so much philosophical as it is just part of the way I (and the community of believers I’m part of) talk. It’s not about philosophy, it’s not about foundational theories of truth, its about understanding one another through a particular sort of dialogue – which is to say nothing at this point about a personal sense of mysticism.
From P.2 (HERE), Psiomniac's comment. My statments are in Green, Psiomniac in Blue, my response in Black
"It's my belief that in this instance the theist needs to offer up a reason why one should believe such a thing in the absence of proof."
"It is my assessment so far that the reasons we have for thinking we interact in dependable ways with a mind-independent reality, are an order of magnitude stronger than any reasons you have offered so far for belief in a specific god."
Since it’s clear that I’m not talking about interacting with a God who’s existence is mind-independent, and since (as of yet) no noncircular reason has been given as to why we should accept that mind-independent entities exist, then I’m not all together certain what burden I’m sacked with in this instance? If we both agree that such an argument doesn’t exist, than no real reason beyond my pragmatic (non-realist) account need be offered for my appeal to God.
"I think we’d both agree following your first paragraph that it would merely be an assumption."
"I wouldn't agree with 'merely'. Rather, I'd say that any functional world view must have a set of foundational assumptions. What differs is what they are and the basis upon which they are held."
Sure, Psiomniac, however I can make the same foundational assumption under my worldview and assert, “God exists”, but as it stands it’s no more or less provable from the realist perspective then your representationalism. What are your foundational assumptions I wonder?
"If one cannot show the truth of represenation, then why should I beleive it?"
"For the same reason that you should believe that you have a head, namely because it is sensible to do so."
Believing that one has a head has nothing necessarily to do with adhering to representationalism or correspondence theory – in other words, I can assert that belief (make the statement) without the philosophical point of view. Or to put it in yet another way, It’s sensible to have the statement in a language game “I have a head”, for reasons outside of philosophy; it directs our attention, speaks to our behavior, makes sense in a given language game, but doesn’t say anything about mind-independent entities per se. Since we don’t sprinkle in theories of truth within our everyday conversations, it’s clear that sensible in this case refers only to philosophical discourse – nothing more.
The way I talk about God, on the other hand, is not so much philosophical as it is just part of the way I (and the community of believers I’m part of) talk. It’s not about philosophy, it’s not about foundational theories of truth, its about understanding one another through a particular sort of dialogue – which is to say nothing at this point about a personal sense of mysticism.
Saturday, January 17, 2009
P.2 The Two Horns of Realism and Non-realism
I’d like to start this where Psiomniac left off in the last comment string where he stated:
“But as we already agreed, you cannot show representation outside of a circular argument. I think we agreed that there can be no non circular argument that justifies our appeal to things like reason or to the existence of things outside our minds. That is to say that the foundationalist quest for a bullet proof argument to show we are justified is doomed.”
To this I believe we both agree…
“But it doesn't follow that there are no reasons at all to suppose that we represent aspects of the phenomenal world. You want to argue perhaps that it is impossible to occupy a position from which we can directly assess a correspondence between what we say and how things are; trying to attain such a transcendental vantage point would be like trying to step outside our own skin.”
Let me build an example from this; lets suppose that I’m a realist and I proclaim that God exists. Naturally the atheist demands proof of which so far in the history of mankind no such thing exists – as such the theist pre-supposes God’s existence. However, is there any reason at all to suppose God doesn’t exist? Does the world assume a creator in much the same way a word assumes a representation? It's my belief that in this instance the theist needs to offer up a reason why one should believe such a thing in the absence of proof.
This is likewise the case for the representationalist; if you want to assume that words are representational and you agree that one cannot prove such a thing, then why should I believe it? I think we’d both agree following your first paragraph that it would merely be an assumption.
“The plausibility of this idea, and perhaps the notion that if there are 'objects' in the world that exist independently of our representations of them, then there is no way in which our representations could intelligibly thought to be 'like' the objects, since the only notions of representation as such that are available to us, are in terms of our concepts and sense experience, rather than the objects themselves. This is taken to introduce the limitation that since we can't know objects in-themselves, we cannot talk meaningfully about them. Thus the notion of representation is a non starter, or so the argument goes.
Is that interpretation close?”
No, not a correct interpretation:
This seems to me to be a statement made from the empiricist’s tool kit that I would simply reject outright. It seems to say, “We can’t know objects because all we can know is sense experience”; and of course we can reduce this to, “We can’t know sense experience because all we can know is cognitive states”, and so on and so on as science opens up new avenues of description we have a reduction ad absurdum.
If one cannot show the truth of represenation, then why should I beleive it?
“But as we already agreed, you cannot show representation outside of a circular argument. I think we agreed that there can be no non circular argument that justifies our appeal to things like reason or to the existence of things outside our minds. That is to say that the foundationalist quest for a bullet proof argument to show we are justified is doomed.”
To this I believe we both agree…
“But it doesn't follow that there are no reasons at all to suppose that we represent aspects of the phenomenal world. You want to argue perhaps that it is impossible to occupy a position from which we can directly assess a correspondence between what we say and how things are; trying to attain such a transcendental vantage point would be like trying to step outside our own skin.”
Let me build an example from this; lets suppose that I’m a realist and I proclaim that God exists. Naturally the atheist demands proof of which so far in the history of mankind no such thing exists – as such the theist pre-supposes God’s existence. However, is there any reason at all to suppose God doesn’t exist? Does the world assume a creator in much the same way a word assumes a representation? It's my belief that in this instance the theist needs to offer up a reason why one should believe such a thing in the absence of proof.
This is likewise the case for the representationalist; if you want to assume that words are representational and you agree that one cannot prove such a thing, then why should I believe it? I think we’d both agree following your first paragraph that it would merely be an assumption.
“The plausibility of this idea, and perhaps the notion that if there are 'objects' in the world that exist independently of our representations of them, then there is no way in which our representations could intelligibly thought to be 'like' the objects, since the only notions of representation as such that are available to us, are in terms of our concepts and sense experience, rather than the objects themselves. This is taken to introduce the limitation that since we can't know objects in-themselves, we cannot talk meaningfully about them. Thus the notion of representation is a non starter, or so the argument goes.
Is that interpretation close?”
No, not a correct interpretation:
This seems to me to be a statement made from the empiricist’s tool kit that I would simply reject outright. It seems to say, “We can’t know objects because all we can know is sense experience”; and of course we can reduce this to, “We can’t know sense experience because all we can know is cognitive states”, and so on and so on as science opens up new avenues of description we have a reduction ad absurdum.
If one cannot show the truth of represenation, then why should I beleive it?
Saturday, December 27, 2008
Systemic Truth / Rorty
Since I’m sufficiently a nerd, upon Matt’s insistence I went right out and picked up a copy of Rorty’s “Contingency Irony and Solidarity”. Right off, pg. 5, was the following – which is what I’ve been trying to get at with my notion of systemic truth: (I don't want to comment on this just yet, I merely throw it out there as it gives me a certain feeling of satisfaction - for now anyway.)
We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.
Truth cannot be out there – cannot exist independently of the human mind – because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true of false. The world on it’s own – unaided by the describing activities of human beings – cannot.
The suggestion that truth, as well as the world, is out there is a legacy of an age in which the world was seen as the creation of a being who had a language of his own. (So in effect we anthropomorphized objective creation)
We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.
Truth cannot be out there – cannot exist independently of the human mind – because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true of false. The world on it’s own – unaided by the describing activities of human beings – cannot.
The suggestion that truth, as well as the world, is out there is a legacy of an age in which the world was seen as the creation of a being who had a language of his own. (So in effect we anthropomorphized objective creation)
Thursday, December 25, 2008
Monday, December 22, 2008
Correspondence Theory and TAG
I'm going to beat this thing to death for sure.
It occurs to me now that Goobers transcendental argument for God (TAG) assumes that the nature of Truth follows the belief that it is a Correspondence with reality - which of course is a philosophy I dismiss. Now I often talk about correspondence, however not with reality, but within a paradigm of thought, a language game, a community.
If one makes the statement, then, that the laws of logic are absolute (as absolutism in this sense implies correspondence), it would have to then pre-suppose that the system we're using to mirror that reality is adequate to do so. In other words, prior to certainty, one must have a sense of 'a priori' certainty regarding the nature of the language and rules for logic that one’s using to reach that reality.
Goober (The Creationist and TAG’ist) was asked:
How do you know your senses or your extrasensory perception were[was] reliable prior to and at the time of your revelation?
(NOTE: Goober believes that without God, one cannot have certainty, however with God, one has certainty)
So I’d like to rephrase just what this question is getting at in by restating the above thoughts:
Again, If we say that we have reached [T]ruth, and for that matter certainty, when our perceptions (and how we reflect them in language using logic and reason) , have successfully mirrored those perceptions with reality; then the question above is trying to flesh out the following from Goober – How can one be certain that the pre-existing language game (system of logic and reason) was adequate to the task of mirroring reality? Part of Goober’s premise on the “proof that God exists” is the axiom that logic and reason are absolute, with no basis for this other then the statement, “Does absolute Truth exist?” Not only is this not a proof of anything (as has been already pointed put in previous posts), but it’s a mere pre-supposition in itself. In other words the first premise helps itself to assuming its own existence and begs the question – yet again, this is given as part of the premise; which is merely to call out something supposedly given.
Goober’s response was as follows (and is quite laughable):
"It’s a package deal :-D God reveals some things to us, such that we can know them for certain...”
It’s a package deal?!? Is he serious? Not only does one have to pre-suppose God in this argument (which is fine, don’t we all) but it pre-supposes the vary thing it uses as proof, BUT WAIT, it’s a PACKAGE DEAL.
Let me quote Rorty again: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Pg. 318, 319:
“…The notion of knowledge as accurate representation lends itself naturally to the notion that certain sorts of representations, certain expressions, certain processes are “basic, “privileged”, and “foundational”. The criticisms of this notion which I have canvassed in the previous chapters are backed up with holistic arguments of the form: We will not be able to isolate basic elements except on the basis of a prior knowledge of the whole fabric within which these elements occur. Thus we will not be able to substitute the notion of “accurate representation” (element-by-element) for that of successful accomplishment of a practice. Our choice of elements will be dictated by our understanding of the practice, rather then the practice’s being “legitimated” by a “rational reconstruction” out of elements. This holist line of argument says that we shall never be able to avoid the “hermeneutic circle”…”
BUT WAIT:
Here Goober will respond, “A prior knowledge of the whole fabric within which these elements occur is a certainty granted by God; we don’t need this prior knowledge, God allows us to be certain of them.” (It’s a package deal, remember)
However this simply won’t do as the TAG argument goes from having premises which lead to a conclusion (God), to now beginning with and pre-supposing the conclusion as a means of validating the premise – and of course this horribly begs the question, it’s nonsense...
So the argument according to TAG becomes:
1.) God exists
(so what)
SIDE NOTE:
There’s another contradiction in the TAG line of reasoning which seems to arise out of the mixing and mingling of [T]ruth as correspondence with certainty as the result of a transcendental pre-supposition. In other words, by invoking a transcendental being as a means of certainty in one’s representations, it begs the further question as to how the transcendental being corresponds to reality beyond a mere subjective claim. This has the effect of blowing any evidence that we have adequate truths which correspond to reality completely out of the water along with the whole notion that we have certainty.
It occurs to me now that Goobers transcendental argument for God (TAG) assumes that the nature of Truth follows the belief that it is a Correspondence with reality - which of course is a philosophy I dismiss. Now I often talk about correspondence, however not with reality, but within a paradigm of thought, a language game, a community.
If one makes the statement, then, that the laws of logic are absolute (as absolutism in this sense implies correspondence), it would have to then pre-suppose that the system we're using to mirror that reality is adequate to do so. In other words, prior to certainty, one must have a sense of 'a priori' certainty regarding the nature of the language and rules for logic that one’s using to reach that reality.
Goober (The Creationist and TAG’ist) was asked:
How do you know your senses or your extrasensory perception were[was] reliable prior to and at the time of your revelation?
(NOTE: Goober believes that without God, one cannot have certainty, however with God, one has certainty)
So I’d like to rephrase just what this question is getting at in by restating the above thoughts:
Again, If we say that we have reached [T]ruth, and for that matter certainty, when our perceptions (and how we reflect them in language using logic and reason) , have successfully mirrored those perceptions with reality; then the question above is trying to flesh out the following from Goober – How can one be certain that the pre-existing language game (system of logic and reason) was adequate to the task of mirroring reality? Part of Goober’s premise on the “proof that God exists” is the axiom that logic and reason are absolute, with no basis for this other then the statement, “Does absolute Truth exist?” Not only is this not a proof of anything (as has been already pointed put in previous posts), but it’s a mere pre-supposition in itself. In other words the first premise helps itself to assuming its own existence and begs the question – yet again, this is given as part of the premise; which is merely to call out something supposedly given.
Goober’s response was as follows (and is quite laughable):
"It’s a package deal :-D God reveals some things to us, such that we can know them for certain...”
It’s a package deal?!? Is he serious? Not only does one have to pre-suppose God in this argument (which is fine, don’t we all) but it pre-supposes the vary thing it uses as proof, BUT WAIT, it’s a PACKAGE DEAL.
Let me quote Rorty again: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Pg. 318, 319:
“…The notion of knowledge as accurate representation lends itself naturally to the notion that certain sorts of representations, certain expressions, certain processes are “basic, “privileged”, and “foundational”. The criticisms of this notion which I have canvassed in the previous chapters are backed up with holistic arguments of the form: We will not be able to isolate basic elements except on the basis of a prior knowledge of the whole fabric within which these elements occur. Thus we will not be able to substitute the notion of “accurate representation” (element-by-element) for that of successful accomplishment of a practice. Our choice of elements will be dictated by our understanding of the practice, rather then the practice’s being “legitimated” by a “rational reconstruction” out of elements. This holist line of argument says that we shall never be able to avoid the “hermeneutic circle”…”
BUT WAIT:
Here Goober will respond, “A prior knowledge of the whole fabric within which these elements occur is a certainty granted by God; we don’t need this prior knowledge, God allows us to be certain of them.” (It’s a package deal, remember)
However this simply won’t do as the TAG argument goes from having premises which lead to a conclusion (God), to now beginning with and pre-supposing the conclusion as a means of validating the premise – and of course this horribly begs the question, it’s nonsense...
So the argument according to TAG becomes:
1.) God exists
(so what)
SIDE NOTE:
There’s another contradiction in the TAG line of reasoning which seems to arise out of the mixing and mingling of [T]ruth as correspondence with certainty as the result of a transcendental pre-supposition. In other words, by invoking a transcendental being as a means of certainty in one’s representations, it begs the further question as to how the transcendental being corresponds to reality beyond a mere subjective claim. This has the effect of blowing any evidence that we have adequate truths which correspond to reality completely out of the water along with the whole notion that we have certainty.
Saturday, November 08, 2008
Truth, Uncertainty and the end of Inquiry
Richard Rorty:
“I think it was unfortunate that Pragmatism became thought of as a theory or definition for Truth. I think it would have been better if the Pragmatists had said; we can tell you about justification but we can’t tell you about truth, there is nothing to be said about it. That is, we know how we justify beliefs, we know that the adjective true is the word we apply to the beliefs that we’ve justified, and we know that a belief can be true without being justified, that’s about all we know about truth.
Justification is relative to an audience and to a range of truth candidates; truth isn’t relative to anything. Just because it isn’t relative to anything there’s nothing to be said about it. Truth with a capitol “T” is sort of like God, there’s not much you can say about God, and that’s why many theologians talk about ineffability and so on.
Contemporary Pragmatists tend to say the word true is indefinable, but none the worse for that, we know how to use it, we don’t have to define it. No description or interpretation is closer to reality then any other; some of them are more useful for some purposes then others, but that’s about all you can say. Nietzsche and perspectivism, which says you can’t rise above interpretations and get to facts, or dig down below interpretations and get to facts, is substantially the same thing as I meant before when I said that pragmatists try to get rid of the reality appearance distinction.”
-----
"The Greek idea is that at a certain point in the process of inquiry you’ve come to rest because you’ve reached the goal. The Pragmatists are saying that we haven’t the slightest idea what it would be like to reach the goal. The idea that the aim of inquiry is correspondence to reality, or seeing the face of God, or substituting facts for interpretation is one that we just can’t make any use of.
All we really know about is how to exchange justifications of our beliefs and desires with other human beings; as far as we can see that will be what human life will be like forever. So Pragmatists regard the Platonist attempt to get away from time into eternity, or get away from conversation into certainty as a product of an age of human history where life on earth was so desperate and it seemed so unlikely that life could ever be better that people took refuge in another world.
Pragmatism comes along with things like the French revolution, industrial technology, all the things that made the 19th century believe in progress. When you think that the aim of life is to make things better for our descendents rather then to reach outside of history and time it alters your sense of what philosophy is good for. In the Platonist and theistic epoch, the point of philosophy was to get you out of this mess and into a better place; God, the realm of Platonic ideas, something like that.
The reaction against this Greek/Christian pursuit of blessedness through union with a natural order is to say, there isn’t any natural order, but there is a possibility of a better life for our great-great-great grandchildren. That’s enough to give you all the meaning and inspiration that you could use. "
-----
Uncertainty:
"Some human beings lead quite certain predictable lives. People in traditional societies, people in such miserable conditions that they have to work 14 hours a day and sleep the rest, there isn’t much uncertainty around. However, the uncertainty in the sense in which philosophers dramatize uncertainty is a luxury. It’s the kind of thing you can deliberately induce in yourself for the shear thrill of it by, say, reading all sorts of books and being uncertain over which ones to believe."
“I think it was unfortunate that Pragmatism became thought of as a theory or definition for Truth. I think it would have been better if the Pragmatists had said; we can tell you about justification but we can’t tell you about truth, there is nothing to be said about it. That is, we know how we justify beliefs, we know that the adjective true is the word we apply to the beliefs that we’ve justified, and we know that a belief can be true without being justified, that’s about all we know about truth.
Justification is relative to an audience and to a range of truth candidates; truth isn’t relative to anything. Just because it isn’t relative to anything there’s nothing to be said about it. Truth with a capitol “T” is sort of like God, there’s not much you can say about God, and that’s why many theologians talk about ineffability and so on.
Contemporary Pragmatists tend to say the word true is indefinable, but none the worse for that, we know how to use it, we don’t have to define it. No description or interpretation is closer to reality then any other; some of them are more useful for some purposes then others, but that’s about all you can say. Nietzsche and perspectivism, which says you can’t rise above interpretations and get to facts, or dig down below interpretations and get to facts, is substantially the same thing as I meant before when I said that pragmatists try to get rid of the reality appearance distinction.”
-----
"The Greek idea is that at a certain point in the process of inquiry you’ve come to rest because you’ve reached the goal. The Pragmatists are saying that we haven’t the slightest idea what it would be like to reach the goal. The idea that the aim of inquiry is correspondence to reality, or seeing the face of God, or substituting facts for interpretation is one that we just can’t make any use of.
All we really know about is how to exchange justifications of our beliefs and desires with other human beings; as far as we can see that will be what human life will be like forever. So Pragmatists regard the Platonist attempt to get away from time into eternity, or get away from conversation into certainty as a product of an age of human history where life on earth was so desperate and it seemed so unlikely that life could ever be better that people took refuge in another world.
Pragmatism comes along with things like the French revolution, industrial technology, all the things that made the 19th century believe in progress. When you think that the aim of life is to make things better for our descendents rather then to reach outside of history and time it alters your sense of what philosophy is good for. In the Platonist and theistic epoch, the point of philosophy was to get you out of this mess and into a better place; God, the realm of Platonic ideas, something like that.
The reaction against this Greek/Christian pursuit of blessedness through union with a natural order is to say, there isn’t any natural order, but there is a possibility of a better life for our great-great-great grandchildren. That’s enough to give you all the meaning and inspiration that you could use. "
-----
Uncertainty:
"Some human beings lead quite certain predictable lives. People in traditional societies, people in such miserable conditions that they have to work 14 hours a day and sleep the rest, there isn’t much uncertainty around. However, the uncertainty in the sense in which philosophers dramatize uncertainty is a luxury. It’s the kind of thing you can deliberately induce in yourself for the shear thrill of it by, say, reading all sorts of books and being uncertain over which ones to believe."
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Systemic Truth vs. Absolute Truth
UPDATE 3/6/10:
I'm reworking this post for various reasons.
In the meantime, the thread arguments can be found --->HERE<--- Which still contain the essence of what was being stated in this post, with some more added.
You can also go --->HERE, "On the Invalidity of Absolute Truth"<---
I'm reworking this post for various reasons.
In the meantime, the thread arguments can be found --->HERE<--- Which still contain the essence of what was being stated in this post, with some more added.
You can also go --->HERE, "On the Invalidity of Absolute Truth"<---
Friday, June 27, 2008
P.1 Jesus & the Big Fish
As an avid fisherman I’m quite familiar with the “Fishermen’s Tale”, which of course can be told in the same manner as I’m going to lay out in any sport, hobby or recreation.
The story evolves over time, and generally flows in the following manner:
1.) A person we’ll call Joe catches a fish and comes home to tell about it.
A.) In his retelling of this magnificent event that just transpired, he is theatrical; he’s playing the motion of the rod and reel in his hands as if it’s happening in real time. His eyes are wide open, he’s exited, he’s yelling, screaming, he’s quite frantic. You’re being pulled through every last detail of the struggle until finally this monster is pulled into the boat (it’s almost as if you’re there with him and you’re hanging on his every last word).
B.) He then proceeds to tell you the size of the fish, which in this case was 5 pounds and 22 inches long (or you may also get the hands apart gesture, "it was this big").
Now this is a rather nice Walleye, of course nothing to write home about, and not a catch of life time, but a good story to cap off a trip.
2.) Without beating around the bush; months transpire and Joe finds himself in an appropriate discussion that reminds him of his earlier catch.
A.) Something is different this time however. The excitement and theatrics that held the first telling are now gone. Somehow the thrill of the moment is now lost, it seems so long ago; and now a funy thing has ahppened. Joe’s fish…. Got bigger.
B.) What did he say it was, 5 pounds and 22 inches, and how far apart were his hands again? Hm, suddenly this thing has grown a inch or so and gained a pound.
3.) As the years pass, so does the size of the fish grow…..
So what’s happening here, is he purposely trying to lie about the fish’s size, is this simply some cheap white lie? Does he really want you to believe this crap?
The funny thing is about tales such as these(or one thing to keep in mind about them), is that the further away from an event you get the less emotionally attached you are to it. Furthermore, the harder it is to remember all those mundane details, and the less excitement remains regarding the event. As a result of this, the fish gets bigger. This subconscious phenomenon compensates for the fact that Joe is unable to convey to you the “feeling of the moment”, and by increasing the size the listener is left to imagine himself in this position, surely understanding this now 8 pound 26 inch fish is quite catch indeed.
So this begs the question, what in reality is actually important? When we tell a story and convey ideas, is truth all that essential? I say no. What is important when we tell stories like these is the way the event made us feel, this is what we’re trying to convey to the interested party. Size and reality in general are completely meaningless. When horror author Stephen King for example, spins a tale of suspense and horror, the fact that the objects in his story are completely unfathomable are beside the point. He wants you to feel fear, that’s the point.
Is Joe a liar? No. He is conveying to you the reality of the situation as he now see’s it.
Jesus, I feel, is this same big fish………
More to come.
The story evolves over time, and generally flows in the following manner:
1.) A person we’ll call Joe catches a fish and comes home to tell about it.
A.) In his retelling of this magnificent event that just transpired, he is theatrical; he’s playing the motion of the rod and reel in his hands as if it’s happening in real time. His eyes are wide open, he’s exited, he’s yelling, screaming, he’s quite frantic. You’re being pulled through every last detail of the struggle until finally this monster is pulled into the boat (it’s almost as if you’re there with him and you’re hanging on his every last word).
B.) He then proceeds to tell you the size of the fish, which in this case was 5 pounds and 22 inches long (or you may also get the hands apart gesture, "it was this big").
Now this is a rather nice Walleye, of course nothing to write home about, and not a catch of life time, but a good story to cap off a trip.
2.) Without beating around the bush; months transpire and Joe finds himself in an appropriate discussion that reminds him of his earlier catch.
A.) Something is different this time however. The excitement and theatrics that held the first telling are now gone. Somehow the thrill of the moment is now lost, it seems so long ago; and now a funy thing has ahppened. Joe’s fish…. Got bigger.
B.) What did he say it was, 5 pounds and 22 inches, and how far apart were his hands again? Hm, suddenly this thing has grown a inch or so and gained a pound.
3.) As the years pass, so does the size of the fish grow…..
So what’s happening here, is he purposely trying to lie about the fish’s size, is this simply some cheap white lie? Does he really want you to believe this crap?
The funny thing is about tales such as these(or one thing to keep in mind about them), is that the further away from an event you get the less emotionally attached you are to it. Furthermore, the harder it is to remember all those mundane details, and the less excitement remains regarding the event. As a result of this, the fish gets bigger. This subconscious phenomenon compensates for the fact that Joe is unable to convey to you the “feeling of the moment”, and by increasing the size the listener is left to imagine himself in this position, surely understanding this now 8 pound 26 inch fish is quite catch indeed.
So this begs the question, what in reality is actually important? When we tell a story and convey ideas, is truth all that essential? I say no. What is important when we tell stories like these is the way the event made us feel, this is what we’re trying to convey to the interested party. Size and reality in general are completely meaningless. When horror author Stephen King for example, spins a tale of suspense and horror, the fact that the objects in his story are completely unfathomable are beside the point. He wants you to feel fear, that’s the point.
Is Joe a liar? No. He is conveying to you the reality of the situation as he now see’s it.
Jesus, I feel, is this same big fish………
More to come.
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