Dawson, we're getting close, the end is near.
NOTE: refer HERE to P.1, P.2 and Dawson's prior response
A few things you stated:
“Again, not [a correspondence] between concepts and reality as in “the thing in itself” (Kant’s “Ding an sich”), but between concepts and the things which we perceive.” That couples nicely with “There is reality, and there is our consciousness of reality, and there is the relationship between the two.” Couple that with “whereas according to representationalism we perceive “appearances” of things, i.e., not the things themselves.”
If I gather you correctly then, what you call “the thing itself”, is that which exists (mabye a bad word there) in perception, not reality. You grant (as I would as well) that there's a world out there, but that we do not (in speaking of truth and facts) mirror the way the world is in itself. I would agree with that as well, we are certainly not mirrors to reality. Furthermore, if I gather you properly, you're stating [e.g.] that there are rocks in reality, however the truths that we speak about them relate not to them as they are in themselves, but to them as they relate to the relationship between us and reality, i.e. in perception. I have no overwhelming issue with that either - at least on a rhetorical level.
I asked:
To spin this another way, would you agree with the statement that, yes, the world causes us to have certain beliefs, but it does not give us the reason? In this way we supply the concepts of ‘objective’, ‘grayness’, ‘rock’, etc., but that the world is none of these things...
You responded:
“I do not think that “the world causes us to have certain beliefs,” as if our minds were passive balls of clay manipulated without our own active participation. Cognition is both active and volitional.”
That really wasn't what I was getting at with the comment (that our minds are passive balls of clay) – let me expound. The volitional/active portion of cognition is what supplies the reasons for believing the things we do (I'd suggest, using your language). Let me throw this out there; I'm with Richard Rorty when he says that beliefs are not representations, but rather habits of action; and that words are not representations, but tools. Furthermore I'd add that the manner with which we define things to be (or talk about things, the nature of our discourse) is related not to the way the world is in itself, but according to how things best suit our current needs and interests. To say that the world causes us to have beliefs is simply to recognize that there is a world out there that's ultimately going to push us around in ways that are not under our control. In that way it will push in certain directions, cause us to have certain beliefs wherein the reasons for those beliefs are our own.
I think where there would ultimately be a hang up between you and I is your idea of an objective process of identification as a means of ascribing truth, and how far that stretches. Secondly, I don't see the need (as a pragmatist) to hold to the axioms you do. The whole idea of a correspondence between concepts and perception (and the above ascribing of truth) seems to leave out what I think is a better idea in (say) Davidson's idea's about triangulation – but that's a whole other conversation. Since we're not arguing anything specific per se, I'm happy to let all this lay for now and simply say we come at things a bit different, yet both agree that Sye is full of shit.
Finally I've seen two people now make comments that say something along the lines of the following (in this case by openlyatheist):
“As for the axiomatic nature of the senses; whenever an apologist pulls some such Plantinga-type move, I simply point out that anyone attempting to convince me my senses aren't reliable makes use of those very senses in presenting their argument to me.”
NOTE: this comes in a couple variations. I wouldn't try to suggest that one's senses are not reliable, the question I had was how one knows they are. Essentially the question aims at putting forth an account of the senses, or a proof of them. Of course, I wouldn't ordinarily ask someone this, but it seemed to apply in the notion that "consciousness is consciousness", taken as an axiom.
This all hangs upon what one means by the senses and consciousness.. If one defines consciousness and the senses as on par with a mental state which aligns itself with (say) a “feeling” (as in, I feel that I'm conscious as I'm perceiving) as opposed to a more behaviorist/objective approach that simply says consciousness is “what we observe” [simply] in other people as they interact with their environment, then you're begging the question and/or presupposing that someone else has such feelings. This runs along the lines of a comment I made earlier in that, you cannot prove with certainty that someone else loves you, you cannot prove they're experiencing a certain mental state. The only thing we can say is that “behaviors” we associate with love are reflected in a certain person, and from that infer certain behavioral patterns from them in the future. In other words I'm making a distinction between consciousness as an internal state, and consciousness as an observed behavior. So the best we can say is that the behaviors we associate with consciousness are present in person “X”, or thing “Y”
If you/we say that to be conscious is simply to perceive something, and steer clear of referring to perception in terms of internal states of affairs, then I have no real problem. Again, since there's no way to prove that something is conscious in terms of referring to internal states, no way to prove that I'm not just some mindless meatpuppet spouting out random words and actions. Let me give an example, let's suppose (as the wonders of science will surely allow) that at some point artificial intelligence becomes so advanced that they create a human being – however, it's not organic, but electronic. Supposing that it's so advance that it can react to anything in it's environment as we do, it can learn, react to pain, take pleasure in a pair of nice tits, (or rippling pecks), i.e. it reflects all the same behavioral patterns as a real person does, would you say this piece of AI is conscious? If not, why? If you would answer no, then in fact it would seem that you are granting and/or presupposing that people have internal states that they feel, even though you can't actually prove or account for it and we're back to having some baggage on hand.
Or perhaps this is an even better thought experiment. Suppose that it's sometime in the future I described above with AI, and you get a horrible cancer in the brain that keeps spreading. As the cancer spreads it's cut out, and they start systematically replacing parts of your brain with equivalent silicon parts that function in the same way that the removed organic brain matter did. Will there come a point in this scenario that you stop being conscious because you are slowing becoming nothing more then an advanced computer? i.e. will there come a point when you have no conscious recognition of internal states, even though you still appear (to everyone else) to be the same person, or in the minimum a person that thinks, talks, reacts in the same manner everyone else does?
PS,
ReplyDeleteI should get extra points for being short!
The axioms of conciousness and identity follow from the axiom of existence.
ReplyDeleteConciousness is automatic and every thought we have is as a direct result of our awareness of the external world.
You said "I wouldn't try to suggest that one's senses are not reliable, the question I had was how one knows they are."
I'm going to assume by senses you mean conciousness, because I'm sure you'll agree that cutting out my tounge, cauterising my nostrils, plucking my eyes etc will still render me capable of thought, despite a lack of the traditional 5 senses.
In questioning conciousness you encounter two problems:
1. Your questioning relies on your conciousness to validate its reliability. Your conciousness does not rely on questioning.
2. It appears you are demanding a level of absolute knowledge around your conciousness. To suggest that we need to be certain of our conciousness to this omnipotent standard begs the question that such a standard is possible.
Vagon,
ReplyDeletefirst off from all the things I've written thus far it should be pretty obvious that I reject certainty outright, and don't hold other people to it. However in this case, I'm only demanding what appears[ed] to be implicit within objectivism.
Take a look at my last 3 paragraphs there, what do you make of what I'm saying? I gather what the axiom is, and how you draw it out, what I'm interested in is what status you give it. Starting where I state:
"If one defines consciousness and the senses as on par with a mental state which aligns itself with (say) a “feeling” (as in, I feel that I'm conscious as I'm perceiving) as opposed to a more behaviorist/objective approach that simply says consciousness is “what we observe” [simply] in other people as they interact with their environment, then you're begging the question and/or presupposing that someone else has such feelings."
Agreed on the certainty point and I think I understand what you're saying in general: and that is axioms have arbitrary (i.e. non-logical) defenses. The problem is by saying/thinking/perceiving this statement you have refuted it and this is what the axioms are intended to show. For example when Sye says (to paraphrase) "How do you account for logic without my god?" he is not only begging the question, but he is also acknowledging that you have logic, exist and are an identity by merely conversing with you.
ReplyDeleteAs requested I'll make some comments on the paragraphs and you can confirm if I've understood:
The first paragraph is a rewriting of the "problem" of induction. Here is where it appears you have a problem with us not being able to be certain of other people's conciousness. We don't need to be, we just have a (high) level of confidence in our knowledge that they are concious. Seeing as human knowledge is (currently) the only knowledge that exists why would we hold it to another standard?
Perhaps you are also driving at the "brain in a jar" problem, perhaps we are in the matrix and we cannot trust our senses sort of thing. This I would place down to a burden of proof. You are not making a leap of faith when you perceive reality and to posit a "brain in the jar" hypothesis is arbitrary by definition.
Comments on 2nd paragraph to come...
there's no way to prove that something is conscious in terms of referring to internal states, no way to prove that I'm not just some mindless meatpuppet spouting out random words and actions.
ReplyDeleteFollowing from the brain in the jar example, this is completely arbitrary. It is without evidence so it is not sound. Any scenario you bring up has requirements of existence and conciousness. The further you go from these concepts the more absurd your argument becomes.
For example brain in a jar requires the conciousness of the existence of brains and jars.
The matrix requires the existence of computers.
So if something could replicate this human conciousness then yes I would assume it was concious and it to would be confined in its thoughts by the axioms.
paragraph three comments to come...
I would think not, any more than wearing clothes makes me non concious. This assumes that the brain replacement actually replicates the process sufficiently.
ReplyDeleteVagon,
ReplyDeleteI hate to do this but I'm going to accuse you of building up a straw man here.
You said:
“Following from the brain in the jar example, this is completely arbitrary.”
But I'm not making that example, and you haven't demonstrated how that example it just like mine.
Look, here's what I think is going on in your responses, and/or in your thinking in general. You're shifting from, on the hand, the context of everyday common sense, to on other, a philosophical context. It's one thing to state with complete common sense that other people have feelings and emotions, and in fact, that we know other people have feelings and emotions. Part of the reason that this is true (and in fact that it makes sense) is because the test for that truth in common sense is our understanding. In everyday rhetoric it doesn't rest atop an axiom of certainty, and we don't walk around trying to hold each other accountable for things before we decide whether or not we're going to listen to them.
continued...
Further, to reduce metaphors like consciousness, and the metaphors of love, happiness, and butterflies in the tummy to mental states is again to shift contexts and in fact change conversation. In a philosophical context, moving from “love” to mental states is a sort of reduction that raises the question, “where does that reduction stop?” or “When have we reached the real truth of the matter?” For example many theists might make the suggestion that “God has filled with the spirit today.” The test for the truth of that statement doesn't lie in reducing that or shifting to another context, the truth lies in the understanding of two people having a conversation. If you take my suggestion (quotes from rorty in my post) seriously, then your cease to make sense of reduction claims and instead start to see behaviors (which language, making noises and marks, gestures etc. are part of) not as things that needs to be accounted for, but as predictors and/or predispositions to behave in certain ways. e.g. from the post, beliefs are habits of actions, words are tools.
ReplyDeletecontinued...
So then, when you make moves like this:
ReplyDelete“The problem is by saying/thinking/perceiving this statement you have refuted it and this is what the axioms are intended to show.”
You're in this instance shifting from the context of the every day to a philosophical context. You're granting something about your axiom that you haven't accounted for, and presupposing it's true by trying to shift the burden on me. Again, if your position on consciousness is behaviorist in nature, then of course, I'm completely with you. But if consciousness is a mere representation of an internal state, then you implicitly hold yourself accountable to how you know that, why it matters, and just what do you intend to support with that anyway (again, realist philosophical system always have within them this idea od epistemic certainty). To me, it's flat out just not interesting, but what is interesting is the ways with which people try to defend these things and that's why I accused Dawson of being a Platonist of the same ilk as Sye as the same distinctions seem to be there, and to be honest, I think he still is and is simply not seeing it yet. Unless of course he takes my behaviorist approach. In which case, if he does, then there's no real need for the axiom anymore, it becomes superfluous.
continued...
You said (in reference to advanced AI and whether or not it's conscious):
ReplyDelete“So if something could replicate this human conciousness then yes I would assume it was concious and it to would be confined in its thoughts by the axioms.”
You said something quite telling here, and that is you would “assume it was conscious”. So it is in fact sounding to me like you're assuming (in everyday common sense) that it has internal states it's aware of. In other words you would assume that, because it's exhibiting certain behaviors, that those behaviors are necessarily connected with underlying mental states of awareness, but once again, that's totally bootless.
I'll probably throw something else up on the main as I'm rambling on... To clean this up...
You said something quite telling here, and that is you would “assume it was conscious”. So it is in fact sounding to me like you're assuming (in everyday common sense) that it has internal states it's aware of. In other words you would assume that, because it's exhibiting certain behaviors, that those behaviors are necessarily connected with underlying mental states of awareness, but once again, that's totally bootless.
ReplyDeleteTo be fair you offered a completely hypothetical example so how could I do anything but assume? Unfortunately we don't yet know how the mind works to a degree to replicate it or even if it is replicable. My assumption was not around its behaviours but around the replication.
Vagon,
ReplyDeletefair enough I suppose, however that still leaves open the question of whether or not we can know consciouness beyond behavior. Can we know for certain that someone is having internal states?
Of course, I don't care about that question myself, but do you? Do you take a behavioral position, or internal state?
Vagon,
ReplyDeletefair enough I suppose, however that still leaves open the question of whether or not we can know consciouness beyond behavior. Can we know for certain that someone is having internal states?
Well I think this is the crux of the question. I think its obvious we cannot know someone beyond what we can observe about them (if that's what you mean by behaviour). But nor should we expect to know anything with that certainty: hence why I was going on about how the question presupposes an unjustified level of knowledge.
Of course, I don't care about that question myself, but do you? Do you take a behavioral position, or internal state?
It seems odd that considering you don't care on the position that you would be asking the question. Nevertheless I don't distinguish between external and internal. there seems to be little point pontificating on something that is by definition arbitrary.
If there is no evidence for a cat flying we do not throw it off a ledge just to be sure.
Similarly if there is no evidence to suggest these people are not concious why would we take the time to investigate it?
Even though I don't care about it myself, it's still important the position you take on the matter because it would demonstrate a similar sort of question begging as sye - which was where all this originally started.
ReplyDeleteIt's one thing to use conscious in a rhetorical everyday sense that we all understand, it's quite another to state (philosophically in argument) that consciousness refers to inner states and feelings that all people have (and that you have certianty of them) as you'll run into the skeptical arguments and beg the question.
Again, you hold it as a self evident axiom. I don't, so you have the floor to demonstrate how it is by something more than saying, "You have to use your consciousness to make these contentions, therefore you prove the axiom is true."
But that's no better then Syes line that God exists because of the impossibility of the contrary, and that without God you couldn't prove anything.
You haven't demonstrated that I'm not just a mindless meatpuppet. And your contention from above demonstrates only that I have certain behavioral patterns, not that I have these so called "internal states".
Wait, oops, you said:
ReplyDelete"I don't distinguish between external and internal"
So what exactly is (philosophically) consciousness?
Your language here seems to suggest that see it as something internal:
"Conciousness is automatic and every thought we have is as a direct result of our awareness of the external world."
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteEven though I don't care about it myself, it's still important the position you take on the matter because it would demonstrate a similar sort of question begging as sye - which was where all this originally started.
ReplyDeleteIf its important then why don't you care? You realise the absurdity you project here right?
and it doesn't beg the question. to contrast Sye has layered a concept of god and attempted to make it an irreducible primary. "Begging the question" itself presupposes conciousness, not in some non-tangible god revealed way, but literally as a flow on from existence.
It's one thing to use conscious in a rhetorical everyday sense that we all understand, it's quite another to state (philosophically in argument) that consciousness refers to inner states and feelings that all people have (and that you have certianty of them) as you'll run into the skeptical arguments and beg the question.
Only when skeptics hold certainty up to an omnipotent standard. I cant reiterate this enough. By what standard (especially since you don't care) do you demand certain knowledge of other people conciousness?
Cont..
Again, you hold it as a self evident axiom. I don't, so you have the floor to demonstrate how it is by something more than saying, "You have to use your consciousness to make these contentions, therefore you prove the axiom is true."
ReplyDeleteI have demonstrated it, I'll do it again and tell me where you disagree: Existence exists. That we can tell existence exists shows conciousness exists.
But that's no better then Syes line that God exists because of the impossibility of the contrary, and that without God you couldn't prove anything.
No its extremely different. This is not some unexplained or exclusive mystically revealed state of affairs. This is open to everyone and obvious to everyone. Its not only defended by retortion (which ?Sye stretches for) but self-evident.
You haven't demonstrated that I'm not just a mindless meatpuppet. And your contention from above demonstrates only that I have certain behavioral patterns, not that I have these so called "internal states".
And you haven't demonstrated that I am not Kraak the Destroyer of Worlds. There is no point to following your claim, what evidence do you have for your position that you don't exists?
You don't and the question is ridiculous because your statement is arbitrary.
Wait, oops, you said:
"I don't distinguish between external and internal"
So what exactly is (philosophically) consciousness?
Your language here seems to suggest that see it as something internal:
"Conciousness is automatic and every thought we have is as a direct result of our awareness of the external world."
It is the perception of existence. Its facilitated by the brain. If you mean to distinguish that somehow our thoughts are separated from an external reality as opposed to being part of it, you have a difficult point to make.
comments were spazzing out so i deleted a couple of reposts.
ReplyDeleteVagon, come on, I just covered that. Certainty is NOT important to my philosophical position, it's important to yours. Sort of like, you don't believe in God (it's not important to you), but someone else might assert that God exists and you may then engage them for proof. But if you don't care, then why bother?
ReplyDeleteWhat I care about Vagon, is having the conversation – I enjoy the debate and the exchange, I'm interested in what you have to say. That's what I care about.
You said”
“I have demonstrated it, I'll do it again and tell me where you disagree: Existence exists. That we can tell existence exists shows conciousness exists.”
Well, right, that's what you assert. Again, what I'm saying is that the best you can do is state that people demonstrate certain habits of action that you associate with this thing called consciousness. Further more, “that we can tell existence exists” is more of a definition of consciousness, then it is a proof of consciousness. Not to mention that it presupposes an internal frame of reference, not a behavioral frame of reference, which again means you need to address the skeptical claim of how you know I'm not just a meatpuppet.
Think of it this way, replace the word consciousness with sense and tell me how this looks, “That we can tell existence exists shows the senses exists.” You see, this conflates the definition of the senses with a proof that the senses exist – or in another way you flat out presuppose the senses by simply defining it, and therefore it's self evident. Telling that existence exists is just how we talk about what the senses are in a rhetorical sense, not to mention that again, it's internally referenced.
ReplyDeleteWe're going in circles here Vagon.
As for existence, see the rest of what I've stated in my conversation with Dawson – which I'll do a final post on here shortly.
Seriously, when the fuck did blogger change it so you could post as much as you wanted in the comment boxes? I took the summer off from my blog, so think I missed that transition. It's really frustrating.
I enjoy the debate and the exchange, I'm interested in what you have to say. That's what I care about.
ReplyDeleteI can handle that.
Well, right, that's what you assert. Again, what I'm saying is that the best you can do is state that people demonstrate certain habits of action that you associate with this thing called consciousness.
Objectivism is a fairly egotistical philosophy. So conciousness is the action of what is going on in my head. So rather than associating it with other people I'm labelling what is self-evident (to myself). I was giving proof of how you could reach that conclusion. I'll get to the how I know you are concious bit in a sec.
Further more, “that we can tell existence exists” is more of a definition of consciousness, then it is a proof of consciousness. Not to mention that it presupposes an internal frame of reference, not a behavioral frame of reference, which again means you need to address the skeptical claim of how you know I'm not just a meatpuppet
So I hope by now you can see that I exist to myself. That I know I exists and that being concious of my existence I have identity. If none of this is true we have absurdity, but I am concious of no absurdity so I base my knowledge on logic. This is the key point in the framework, because logic tell me a bit about interpreting knowledge. From here we develop concepts about various things including your (and other peoples) conciousness.
Your current position is, as you said, the skeptical position of doubting knowledge. If I doubt, I am at the same time asserting a lack of knowledge, that doubt/assertion must be founded on something. If it is not it is arbitrary by definition.
So the skeptic paints themselves into a corner by the assertion of doubt: either a foundation which is self-evident and contradicts via retortion or an arbitrary statement which deserves no attention by definition.
“I enjoy the debate and the exchange, I'm interested in what you have to say. That's what I care about.”
ReplyDeleteLet me be perfectly clear, Vagon, I'm in this blog business to hopefully run into some interesting conversation partners. Sorting out problems is merely a bonus.
I'm going to bring the rest of this to a post – maybe not tonight though. Hang in there!